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In the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia.
October T erm, 1922.

National A ssociation of Certified
Public Accountants, a corporation,
appellant,
v.
T he U nited States of America.

No. 3870.

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.

S T A T E M E N T O F TH E C A S E .

This appeal involves the question of whether or
not the appellant, National Association of Certified
Public Accountants, a corporation, may be enjoined
from issuing so-called “ degrees of certified public
accountant.”
A bill in equity was filed by the United States,
through its attorney for the District of Columbia,
under the provisions of section 793 of the Code of
Law for the District of Columbia, which section
reads as follows:

Sec. 793. I njunction.— The district attor
ney may file a bill in the name of the United
States in said supreme court for the purpose
of restraining b y injunction any corporation
20254-22----- 1
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organized under the laws of the District from
assuming or exercising any franchise, liberty,
or privilege or transacting any business not
allowed by its charter or certificate of incor
poration or not by law allowed to be assumed
or exercised by said corporation, and said
district attorney may file a bill to enjoin
any foreign corporation from transacting in
the District of Columbia any business not
allowed by its charter or certificate of incor
poration, or from transacting any business
in said District when it has not complied
with any provision of this code relating to
foreign corporations; and in the same manner
may file a bill to restrain any individuals from
exercising any corporate rights, privileges, or
franchises not granted to them by law; and
on the filing of any such bill the said supreme
court shall have power to issue an injunction
as prayed and to exercise all the powers of a
court of equity over the subject matter of
such bill.
The bill (Rec. p. 2) alleges, in substance, that
the appellant was incorporated in the District of
Columbia with four incorporators, and that the cer
tificates of incorporation set forth that the purposes
for which the corporation was formed were—
To bring together in one common union
certified public accountants who are now,
or heretofore have been, engaged in the prac
tice of professional accounting; also those
who, by virtue of education, personal endow
ments, technical training, and experience are
qualified to perform the duties pertaining to

professional accounting; to provide for the
admission of members; and when said mem
bers shall have presented satisfactory evi
dence of knowledge in the theory and prac
tice of accounting, and shall have satisfac
torily passed the prescribed qualifying exami
nation of the association to admit said mem
bers to the degree of certified public account
ant, and to issue to such members the associa
tion’s formal certificate to that degree pertaining;
to safeguard the rightful professional inter
ests and promote the freindly and social and
public relations of the members of this cor
poration; and to do all else incident, appur
tenant, and germane to the purposes and
objects of this corporation.
The bill further sets up facts showing that appellant
was issuing indiscriminately, for the sum of $10 each,
degrees of certified public accountant, and that, in
the nine months of its existence, it had issued over
2,500 such degrees.

The form of the degree is repro

duced opposite page 24 of the record.
The bill concludes with a prayer that the appellant
be enjoined from issuing these degrees.
The defendant answered (Rec. p. 28), admitting
its incorporation and the issuance of the degrees, as
set forth in the bill.

It endeavored in its answer to

allege facts to substantiate its claim that it was acting
in good faith in issuing such degrees, and that such
degrees were issued only after a full and careful exami
nation into the qualifications of the applicants.
The Government then moved to strike out the
answer and for a decree pro confesso, on the grounds
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(1) that the answer alleged no facts which, if true,
constituted a defense to the cause of action alleged
in the bill of complaint, and (2) that the answer ad
mitted that the defendant was incorporated in the
District of Columbia, as alleged in the bill, and that
it was issuing the so-called degrees of certified public
accountant, as alleged. (Rec. p. 45.)
This motion was granted, with leave to defendant
to amend its answer, but, defendant electing not to
amend and to stand upon its answer as filed, a final
decree was entered enjoining it from issuing such
degrees.

(Rec. pp. 45, 46.)

From this decree appellant prosecutesthis appeal.
A R GU M E N T.

I.
There is n o authority in law for a corporation organ
ized under the laws o f the D istrict o f C olum bia to
issue degrees o f certified public a ccountant.

The designation “ certified public accountant” has
come to have a well-defined meaning.

It refers to

one who has had that title conferred upon him by a
State.

In every State of the Union there are statutes

prohibiting one from using this or a similar designa
tion, or the abbreviations “ C. P. A.,” unless he has
been authorized so to do by a State board, in a man
ner similar to that by which a license is granted a
physician to practice his profession or by which a
lawyer is admitted to the bar.

The District of Co

lumbia is the only place in the United States where
there is not such a statute.
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The statutes of the several States relating to
public accountants are substantially the same.

The

law of Maryland, as amended by the act of 1916, is
a fair example of all.
vol. 4, p. 555.)

(B agby’s Ann. Code of Md.,

Section 1 of this statute provides

that a person “ who shall have received from the
Governor of the State of Maryland a certificate of
his qualification to practice as a certified public
accountant, as hereinafter provided, shall be styled
and known as a certified public accountant, and no
other person shall assume such title, or use the abbre
viation ' C. P. A .’ or any other words, letters, or figures
to indicate that the person so using the same is such
certified public accountant.’ ’

Section 2 provides for

the appointment of an examining board; section 3
defines the nature of the examination to be given;
section 4 authorizes the revocation of certificates for
cause; section 5 prescribes the necessary educational
requirements; section 6 provides for reciprocity with
other States under certain conditions, and section 7
fixes the penalties for violations of the law.
The only provision in the District Code authorizing
the conferring of degrees is found in Subchapter I of
the incorporation law of the District, relating to
institutions of learning (secs. 574 to 586, D. C. Code),
and it was held in Dancy v. Clark (24 App., D. C.
487) that it was intended that the various forms of
corporations were to be kept separate.

But the

degrees there referred to in Subchapter I are academ
ical and honorary, and it is contended by counsel for
appellant, and with their contention we have no
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quarrel, that the so-called degree of certified public
accountant is not such a degree as is contemplated
by that subchapter of the code.
From the form of appellant’s certificate of incorpo
ration and the number of incorporators it is manifest,
as admitted on page 1 of appellant’s brief, that appel
land was incorporated under Subchapter III of the
District incorporation law, relating to benevolent,
educational, and kindred societies (secs. 599 to 604,
D. C. Code).

Section 599 of the code sets forth the

purposes for which such a corporation may be formed,
as follows:

Sec. 599. Certificate.— Any three or more
persons of full age, citizens of the United
States, a majority of whom shall be citizens of
the District, who desire to associate themselves
for benevolent, charitable, educational, lit
erary, musical, scientific, religious, or mis
sionary purposes, including societies formed for
mutual improvement or for the promotion of
the arts, may make, sign, and acknowledge,
before any officer authorized to take acknowl
edgment of deeds in the District, and file in the
office of the recorder of deeds, to be recorded
by him, a certificate in writing, in which shall
be stated—
First. The name or title by which such
society shall be known in law.
Second. The term for which it is organized,
which may be perpetual.
Third. The particular business and objects
of the society.

Fourth. The number of its trustees, di
rectors, or managers for the first year of its
existence.
Contrary to the statement on page 2 of appel
lant’s brief that it was permanently enjoined from
making any use of its charter, the prayers of the bill
did not seek to prevent, and the final decree does not
prevent, appellant from operating under the pro
visions of its charter relating to an organization for
mutual improvement, inasmuch as, to that extent,
it is conceded appellant had the authority of the sec
tion of the code above quoted.

But there is no pro

vision of law authorizing this or any other District
of Columbia corporation either to confer the degrees
complained of or to certify that one is a public
accountant.
A corporation, being the creature of statute, can be
organized only for the objects authorized by the law
under which it is created, and can exercise only the
powers expressly conferred upon it by statute or
such as are necessarily incident to carrying into effect
the authority expressly granted.

Of course, the con

ferring of the degrees complained of is not a neces
sary incident to the organization of a mutual im
provement association.
A corporation is the creature of the law, and
none of its powers are original. They are pre
cisely what the incorporating act has made
them, and can only be exerted in the manner
which the act authorizes. In other words, the
State prescribes the purposes of a corporation
and the means of executing those purposes.
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Purposes and means are within the State’s
control.
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S.
28, 43.
See also
Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman’s Car
Co., 139 U. S. 24, 48, 49.
Oregon Railway Co. v. Oregonian Ry. Co.,
130 U. S. 1.
This rule should be applied with the utmost strict
ness where a corporation, as here, is assuming to
confer a designation of a public character.
While the

District

of

Columbia

possesses

no

statute prohibiting one from designating himself as
a certified public accountant, or, as more commonly
abbreviated, a “ C. P. A.,” that term, when used
by an accountant in the District of Columbia, has
come to mean that some State has certified that he is
possessed of superior education and skill, and is of
good moral character.

Therefore, a resident of the

District, in employing an accountant, would be
guided in his selection to one possessing such a cer
tificate.

But this designation becomes valueless in

this District, if this appellant be permitted to confer
upon those whom it sees fit, the degree complained of.
In this connection the letter from the appellant to
Harry W. Bundy (Rec. p. 15) is of interest.

There

it is said:
We have adopted the following designation
for signature of members of the national asso
ciation outside of the District of Columbia,
C. P. A. (N. A.).
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In other words, this appellant instructs its mem
bers practicing accountancy in the States to add to
the abbreviation “ C. P. A .” the letters ( “ N. A .” ),
which stand, of course, for national association, in
the hope that thereby its members can improperly
receive credit from the public for having passed a
State board, and at the same time, upon a techni
cality, escape prosecution for violation of the State
laws. But its members doing business in the Dis
trict are advised that they may, with impunity, by
virtue of this so-called degree, hold themselves out
as certified public accountants.
II.

A ppellant acquired n o right to issue the degrees
com plain ed o f by virtue o f the recording o f its
charter.

It is contended by counsel for appellant that,
when the recorder of deeds accepted for filing and
recording the certificate of incorporation containing
the clause relating to the issuance of degrees of cer
tified public accountant, that certificate became a
contract between appellant and the United States
which can not be attacked in this proceeding.

Had

the recorder refused to accept the whole certificate
for filing, because of the objectionable provision, he
would have been well within his rights.
In the case of Dancy v. Clark, 24 App. D. C. 487,
a certificate was presented to the recorder of deeds
for the incorporation under subchapter 4 of the
incorporation law of the District (secs. 605 to 644,
20254—22------2
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D. C. Code) of a company to engage in a number of
forms of businesses.

The recorder refused to accept

the certificate, and a proceeding was brought for a
writ of mandamus to compel him to receive the
certificate.

This court, holding that a corporation

could be formed for only one of the purposes enu
merated in subchapter 4, refused the writ.
That the recorder of deeds, in the press of business,
failed to notice the improper part of appellant’s
certificate of incorporation, and accepted and re
ceived the same, does not create a valid contract
between appellant and the United States.

A con

tract entered into in violation of law is void.
In the case of Oregon Railway Co. v. Oregonian
Ry. Co., 130 U. S. 1, the court said:
Of course any authority for the exercise of
corporate powers, derived from the laws of
Oregon, must be in accord with the constitu
tion of that State and its statutes upon that
subject. * * * It is idle to say, therefore,
that any corporation could assume to itself
powers of action by the mere declaration in its
articles or memorandum that it possessed
them.
In the Dancy case, this court said:
Consequently, even if a paper appears to
have been regularly executed so as to entitle it
to record, and the recorder had exceeded his
authority in refusing to receive and record it,
yet the court will not, by the writ of man
damus, coerce his action, if it appears upon
consideration of the contents of the paper that
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it is invalid in law, for, in that event, to coerce
his action and to command his receipt of the
paper would be a nugatory thing in law.
In the same case, the court, referring to a situation
where, as here, a certificate of incorporation con
taining objectionable features had actually been re
ceived and filed, said:
In such cases the certificate is upheld so far
as it is valid, and the illegal parts, if any, are
disregarded.
And in the case of American Elementary Electric Co.
v. Normandy, 46 App. D. C. 329, this court said:
That the articles of incorporation of the Dis
trict company were voidable is clear under the
decision of this court in Dancy v. Clark, 24
App. D. C. 487. A corporation many not be
lawfully formed here to accomplish all the ob
jects enumerated in those articles, and no
primary purpose is expressed, nor is one de
ducible from the language used. Consequently
the objects enumerated must be viewed as a
whole, and, when so viewed, it is apparent
that there was no warrant in law for the incor
poration.
As before pointed out, all that the Government
prayed in this proceeding, and all that the final de
cree accorded it, was that the illegal part of appellant’s
charter be disregarded.
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III.
A ppellan t’ s schem e is fraudulent.

In the view we take of this case, since appellant
is assuming to exercise corporate privileges without
authority of law, it is immaterial whether or not it is
so acting in good faith.

However, the bad faith of

appellant should not pass unnoticed.

A reading of

the conceded facts in the record of this case can not
but be convincing that appellant’s whole scheme in
issuing the

so-called

degrees of

certified

public

accountant is a fraudulent one: First, to aid the un
scrupulous person under some semblance of right to
represent to the public that he possesses the necessary
qualifications as to education, ability, and character
to be certified by a State as a public accountant; and,
second, to induce the innocent person to part with the
sum of $10 in return for a worthless sheet of paper
purporting to confer upon him the degree of certified
public accountant, with “ all the honors, rights, and
privileges to that degree appertaining,” in the belief
that he is receiving something of value.

Appellant

represented, and it is not denied (see letter to Morris,
Rec. p. 10),that “ The association is duly incorporated
under the laws of the District of Columbia, and by this
law we are empowered to admit members of the degree
of C. P. A. and issue to them the certificate of the
National Association C. P. A .”
The two letters from appellant to Harry W. Bundy
(Rec. pp. 15, 16, and 17), which are not denied in
the answer, present a striking example of appellant’s
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lack of good faith.

The first letter, dated December

24, 1921, advises Bundy that “ the board of exami
ners of the national association have passed favor
ably on your application,” and “ on December 24th
we sent you your membership certificate, to be deliv
ered to you by the American Railway Express Com
pany.”

Just why the express should have been

resorted to instead of the more convenient method
of the mail is hard to explain, except upon the
theory that the officers of appellant corporation
knew they were engaged in a fraudulent scheme and
hoped, if possible, to evade prosecution for using the
mails to defraud.

The certificate referred to in the

letter (Rec. pp. 15 and 16) recites that Bundy had
“ presented satisfactory evidence as to his knowl
edge of the theory, science, and practice of account
ancy” or had “ passed the prescribed examination,”
and “ upon him is conferred the degree of certified
public accountant, with all of the honors, rights,
and privileges to that degree appertaining.” Appar
ently something occurred after the writing of this
letter and the expressing of the certificate to place
the officers of appellant corporation upon their
guard, and they followed it, on December 28th, with
another letter reading, in part, as follows:
After careful investigation the board of
examiners and the board of governors of this
organization have arrived at the conclusion
that while you do not meet the standards set
for our members, yours is a worthy case, and
in order that you will be given an incentive

14
to greater effort so as to perfect yourselves in
accountancy and to hold up the standards of
this profession and to raise if possible the
standards now produced, we have decided to
accept you as a member and to urge upon
you the necessity of continually striving to
perfect your knowledge of the theory and prac
tice of the profession.
W e request and urgently urge you to re
strain from using your title or from attempt
ing to practice the profession until such time
as you know that you are sufficiently qualified
to meet the demands which may be made upon
you.
Stripped of its camouflage and self-serving declara
tions, this letter is a plain admission that appellant
conferred its so-called degree of certified public
accountant upon one whom it knew was not qualified
as an accountant.

Another instance of bad faith is

that, while in this letter appellant urgently requests
Bundy not to make use of the title bestowed upon
him, it addresses him as “ Mr. Harry W. Bundy,
C. P. A. (N. A .).”
That appellant corporation was organized solely
for the purpose of selling the degrees complained of
is apparent from the assertion of counsel for appel
lant on page 2 of their brief that a final decree was
entered “ permanently enjoining appellant from mak
ing any use of its charter.”

Inasmuch as such relief

was neither prayed nor granted, counsel’s statement
can be justified only upon the theory that the only
portion of the charter which appellant regarded as of
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any value, and the only portion used or intended to
be used, is that which relate s to the issuance of these
degrees.

The clauses of the charter providing for an

organization for mutual improvement were undoubt
edly inserted to conceal the real object of the cor
poration from the watchful eye of the recorder of
deeds.

Nor is it surprising that appellant values the

objectionable provision above all others when we
consider that in the nine months of its existence
before the filing of this suit it had sold over 2,500 of
its worthless degrees at $10 each. Surely such an
income-producing charter provision is not to be
treated lightly.
IV.
A m o tio n to strike is the proper procedure to test th e
sufficiency o f an answer.

It is conceded that prior to the new equity rules the
only method provided for testing the sufficiency of an
answer was by setting the case down for hearing upon
bill and answer.

This was because the answer was

more than a pleading— it was evidence for the de
fendant.

But equity rule No. 10 of the Rules of

Practice of the Supreme Court of the District pro
vides:
The verification of a pleading does not apply
to the amount claimed except in an action
founded on contract, express or implied, for
the payment of money only; and verification
shall not make other or greater proof necessary
on the side of the adverse party.
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Thus, it will be seen, an answer has lost its eviden
tiary character, and has become a mere pleading.
Equity rule No. 39 of the Supreme Court of the
District (which is identical with rule 33 of the Federal
Equity Rules) provides as follows:
Exceptions for insufficiency of an answer are
abolished. But if an answer set up an affirma
tive defense, set-off, or counterclaim, the
plaintiff may, upon five days’ notice, or such
further time as the court may allow, test the
sufficiency of the same by motion to strike out.
If found insufficient but amendable, the court
may allow an amendment upon terms or strike
out the matter.
The practice adopted in this case has been followed
and approved in a number of cases in the Supreme
Court of the District.

On page 95 of the record in

the case of Federal

Trade Commission v. Claire

Furnace Co. et al., No. 3798 in this court, will be
found an opinion by Mr. Justice Bailey sustaining
this practice, the material portions of which opinion
read as follows:
Under the rules and practice in equity prior
to the present rules there is no question but
that no demurrer to an answer would he, nor
was there any way of testing the sufficiency
of an answer as a defense but by setting down
the case for hearing on bill and answer. An
answer was evidence as well as a pleading; and
on hearing on bill and answer, the answer
being evidence, the hearing was final. Even
where the bill waived an answer under oath,
and an unverified answer was filed, the same
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rule was followed where the hearing was on
bill and answer. This was expressly provided
for in the rules of the United States Supreme
Court. (Equity rule 41.)
“ If the complainant in his bill shall waive
an answer under oath, * * * the answer
of the defendant, though under oath, * * *
shall not be evidence in his favor unless the
cause be set for hearing on bill and answer
only * **."
This provision of the former rules was not
carried into the present rules. An answer,
although verified (excluding answers to inter
rogatories), is no longer evidence. While the
sufficiency of a plea (which was never evi
dence) could be tested by setting it down for
argument, under the new rules the matter of
a plea must be incorporated in the answer and
the plea becomes a part of the answer.
In my opinion, by analogy to the former
practice in regard to pleas, the sufficiency of
the matters of both pleas and answers as
defenses may be tested by proceedings in the
nature of setting down the same for argument
or by a motion to strike, the latter being more
in accordance with the present methods of
testing the sufficiency of bills and cross claims.
In Shera v. Merchants Life Ins. Co., 237 Fed.
484, the same view of the present practice is
taken.
In the case of Shera v. Merchants Life Ins. Co., 237
Fed. 484, the court said:
(1) Under previous equity rules, upon sub
mission upon bill and answer, the answer
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became evidence— “ the only evidence that
defendant needs, for it must be taken as true
in all respects.” Harris Reynolds v. First
National Bank, 112 U. S. 405. The present
equity rules do not seem to contemplate the
submission of a case upon bill and answer;
they seem rather to direct that the suffi
ciency of the answer as a defense, in view of
the averments of the bill of complaint, shall
be raised by motion to strike. (Equity rule
33.)
This procedure was impliedly recognized by this
court in Phillips v. Noel Construction Co., 49 App.
D. C. 379, where it is said:
But this is denied by said defendants in
their answer, which has to be taken as true
under the course the plaintiffs have seen fit
to pursue in presenting their case; that is,
by their motion to strike out and electing to
stand upon that motion when overruled.
This practice is one which should meet with the
approval of this court. It furnishes an expeditious
and inexpensive method of securing justice to a
plaintiff with a meritorious case.

It clears the trial

calendar of cases in which no sufficient defense has
been interposed, without depriving the defendant
of any right he might otherwise have.

Certainly,

if a defendant is unable to allege a defense, he would
be unable to prove one.
It is impossible to conceive of any injury resulting
to appellant by reason of the adoption of this pro
cedure.

To sustain this decree, it is only necessary
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to find the existence of two facts— (1) that appellant
was incorporated in the District of Columbia as
alleged and (2) that it was issuing the degrees com
plained of— both of which facts are admitted by the
answer.

Had the Government elected to calendar

the case for trial, and a trial been had, no evidence
need have been offered, since all of the material alle
gations of the bill are admitted.

Appellant was

given an opportunity to amend, which it declined,
electing to stand upon its answer as filed.

What

advantage could appellant have gained other than
delay had the Government been required to proceed
to trial?

As all of the material facts of the case

were before the court and undisputed, a final decree
was appropriate.
CO N CLU SIO N .

It is respectfully submitted that the decree of the
court below should be affirmed.

P eyton G ordon,
United States Attorney.
V ernon E. W est,
Assistant United States Attorney.
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